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During the 1990 congressional redistricting many states were mandated to create additional 
majority minority-resident districts in order to elect more minorities to Congress. Civil rights 
groups and Republicans cheered. The Party views Democratic districts stripped of Black voters as 
opportunities to repaint blue districts red. The academic literature agrees, attributing the 
Republican return to House control in 1994 to race based redistricting. However, this literature 
generally focuses on the district as the unit of analysis, a focus that is too narrow, as some 
districts gain Black residents while others lose them. I focus on states, the level at which 
redistricting occurs. By comparing congressional delegations of states under greater pressure to 
create majority minority districts with those under less pressure in a difference-in-difference 
framework, I find no evidence that the creation of majority minority districts leads to more 
conservative House delegations. In fact point estimates indicate that states that increased their 
share of majority Black districts saw their delegations grow increasingly liberal. I find similar 
results for Latino districts in the southwest. Thus I find no evidence of the alleged tradeoff 
between having minority representatives and representatives who support minorities’ preferred 
policies. 
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 1
I Introduction  
 In 1994 the Republican Party won a majority of seats in the United States House of 
Representatives for the first time in 40 years. The credit (or blame depending on political 
preference) for this feat has been directed, at least in part, at the large number of majority 
minority voting districts carved out in the preceding round of redistricting. The idea that  the 
creation of majority minority districts moves congress in a more conservative direction has been 
espoused prior to, during and now after that 1990 redistricting in the face of more than a decades 
worth of post-event data. And although the Republican Party based its spending on it1 and a line 
of research backs it2, in this paper I find no evidence to support the contention that majority 
minority districts increase congressional conservatism. In fact point estimates from a simple 
difference-in-difference analysis comparing states required to increase the number of majority 
minority districts with those who faced no such mandate, suggest the opposite, that more majority 
minority districts results in a more liberal state congressional delegation.   
 Although redistricting plans are made at the state level, the majority of the empirical 
literature on the impact of majority minority districts generally focuses on the district as the unit 
of analysis.3 These studies use both cross-sectional and panel data to show that as the percent of 
Black voters decreases in a district, the likelihood of electing a Republican increases and the 
voting record of the elected representative moves in a more conservative direction. (See for 
                                                 
1 During the 1990 round of redistricting, to help maximize the number of majority minority districts 
created, the Republican National Committee developed and distributed software to minority groups to 
allow these groups to construct their own redistricting plans to submit to their state legislatures for 
consideration (Cunningham, 2001).Wrote Republican strategist Lee Atwater (1990), “Where minority 
districts currently exist, they must be maintained…where minority districts can be created they must be 
created.” 
2 Lublin (1997) cites seven authors whose empirical work has led them to conclude, as does he, that the 
increase in the number of majority minority districts increased the number of Republicans in congress. 
Cunningham (2001) writes that the “moderate consensus” of political scientists is that the 1990 redistricting 
cost the Democrats 7-12 seats in the 1992 and 1994 elections. Two exceptions in the academic community 
are Guinier (1995) and Engstrom (1995) who argue that a nationwide movement of voters in a more 
conservative direction caused the Republicans to gain seats in the 1994 election. 
3 Exceptions are Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) who simulate the characteristic of post-1990 
state level delegations using pre-1990 data and Shotts (2003) who shows that the number of representatives 
who vote to the left of the median is increasing in the number of majority minority districts. 
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example Hill 1995, Lublin 1999, Bullock 1995 and Overby and Cosgrove 1996.) Because Blacks 
must be pulled from a number of districts to create a majority minority district, these studies 
conclude that majority minority districts have a perverse effect of moving the congress in a more 
conservative direction. At the same time, the newly created minority districts send Blacks to 
congress. Thus, prior literature argues, Blacks face a tradeoff between increased descriptive 
representation (having representatives who look like them) and increased substantive 
representation (having representatives who vote in the way that they would like). (See for 
example Swain, 2006). Clearly substantive representation is important for the passage of policy. 
Descriptive representation, proponents say, is important not only for psychological well-being, 
but more tangibly for bringing social services and employment to Black communities. There is a 
small literature documenting a correlation between the presence of Black elected officials and 
spending on social services and between the presence of Black elected officials and Black 
employment (e.g., Karnig and Welch, 1980, Dye and Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982 and most 
recently Nye, Rainer and Stratmann, 2010), however a causal link has not been established. 
 The evidence for a tradeoff is based on analysis at too small a level of aggregation. While 
the creation of majority minority districts decreases the fraction of minority voters in some 
districts their creation increases the fraction in others. Thus a district level analysis cannot answer 
the question of whether the creation of these districts moved the state’s congressional delegation 
to the right. A second limitation of prior work is that authors have failed to account for bias 
stemming from the endogeneity of the decision to create majority minority districts. 
 In this paper, I ask how an increase in majority minority districts impacts the 
characteristics of the delegation that a state sends to congress. I primarily focus on the southern 
United States where Blacks represent the largest fraction of the population and the number of 
majority Black districts increased astronomically, from six to 20 with the 1990 redistricting. I 
consider a variety of outcomes: the racial and party make-up of the delegation as well as how 
liberal the delegation’s voting record is in general and with respect to those issues that are of 
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greatest concern to minorities. My time frame is the five congressional sessions (10 years) before 
and after the 1990 redistricting which allows for examination of two exogenous shocks to the 
number of majority minority districts: 1) The initial charge to increase the share of majority 
minority districts and 2) The later order to dismantle more than half of these districts following 
court rulings declaring them unconstitutional because of their basis in race. Finally, I expand 
consideration to a second liberal leaning minority population: Latinos in the southwest of the 
United States.  
 Employing a simple difference-in-difference design comparing southern states that faced 
greater pressure to increase their share of majority minority districts with those southern states 
that faced no increased pressure, I find no tradeoff between Black descriptive and substantive 
representation. I find that while majority Black districts significantly increased the number of 
Blacks in congress, they did not significantly increase the number of Republicans or move the 
delegation’s voting record to the right, generally or on those issues that are of greatest concern to 
Blacks. In fact point estimates indicate that the increase in majority minority districts was 
accompanied by a leftward movement in the state’s delegation. This finding holds controlling for 
state demographics and state political trends, across definitions of what constitutes the “south,” as 
well as across definitions of what constitutes a treatment state. Finally, I find that in the 
southwest, the creation of majority Latino districts also does not move the delegation in a more 
conservative direction. Thus I find no evidence of a tradeoff between descriptive and substantive 
representation for Latinos either.   
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section II I present the theoretical 
argument of how majority minority districts could increase the delegations’ conservatism. In 
Section III I provide a history of the Voting Rights Act and in particular the 1982 amendment that 
led to the increase in majority minority districts post 1990. I detail data and methodology in 
Section IV, before presenting the results in Section V and concluding in Section VI.  
II Theory 
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 Why would a mandate to create majority minority districts—districts that would certainly 
elect Democrats to the legislature—increase the share Republican of the state’s delegation? The 
argument rests on the idea that White Democrats can be more easily persuaded to vote 
Republican than can Black Democrats. 
 As Shotts (2001 and 2002) lays out if voters always vote for candidates of their own party 
then a majority minority mandate will not alter the gerrymanderer’s optimal redistricting strategy, 
with few exceptions. The gerrymanderer’s goal is to send the maximum number of delegates 
from his party to Congress, subject to the number of districts allocated to him in the census and 
the requirements that districts have roughly equal populations of residents.  If Democrats have 
control of the state legislature, as was the case in all of the southern states in 1990, then their 
optimal strategy in the absence of a majority minority mandate is to distribute voters to create the 
maximum number of majority Democratic districts possible. The requirement to create majority 
minority districts is not a binding constraint on that strategy. To fix ideas consider a state that 
must create three districts of size 100 each. The population consists of 198 White Republicans, 51 
Black Democrats and 51 White Democrats. Without the majority minority mandate the 
Democratic gerrymanderer would create two majority Democratic districts and one majority 
Republican district.  Mandated to create as many majority Black districts as possible, the same 
gerrymanderer would create two majority Democratic districts (one majority Black, the other 
majority White) and one White Republican district. Thus the party composition of the 
congressional delegation (two Democrats and one Republican) is unchanged by the mandate. 
 If Republicans are in control of the redistricting process, then the constraint may be 
binding in the case, as in the example above, where there are enough Republican voters to 
construct all districts as majority Republican. Under the mandate, Republicans must create one 
majority minority district. Thus where voters remain loyal to their party, the introduction of the 
mandate will either leave the state delegation unchanged or move it to the left. (This analysis 
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assumes that there is no mandate to create supermajority minority districts and that there are no 
geographic impediments4 to district creation. Both were the case during the 1990 redistricting.)  
 However, when we allow for the notion that voters can be persuaded the calculus is 
different. In the Republican Party’s estimation White Democrats are more easily persuaded to 
vote Republican than are Black Democrats (Cunningham, 2001). Data from the National Election 
Studies bears them out. In the five elections preceding the one in which the 1990 redistricting 
took effect, six percent of Blacks who identified as Democrats claimed to have voted Republican 
in the most recent congressional election, while 22 percent of White Democrats made that claim.5 
So again to fix ideas assume that a highly qualified Republican candidate cannot persuade Black 
Democrats to vote Republican, but can persuade two percent of White Democrats to do so. Then 
returning to the example above, with the Democrats in control of redistricting, without a mandate, 
the gerrymanderer creates two majority Democratic districts (both with an approximately equal 
mix of Black and White Democrats) and one majority Republican district. In expectation with a 
highly qualified candidate Republicans will win at most 49.52 percent of the vote in a majority 
Democratic district.6 Thus the delegation that the state sends to congress consists of two 
Democrats and one Republican as before. However, under the mandate the district compositions 
are: 1) 51 Black Democrats and 49 White Republicans, 2) 51 White Democrats and 49 White 
Republicans and 3) 100 White Republicans. In expectation with a highly qualified candidate a 
Republican will win in district 2 with 50.02 percent of the vote.7 The Republicans run a highly 
qualified candidate in the White Democratic district and the resulting state delegation now 
                                                 
4For example if Black and White Democrats live in adjoining neighborhoods then creating a contiguous 
district comprised of 51 percent Black Democrats and 49 percent White Republicans may be impossible.  
5 Authors calculations using National Election Studies data 1982-1990. 
6 Take the district that has 26 White Democrats, 25 Black Democrats and 49 White Republicans. With a 
highly qualified candidate, Republicans can win the votes of the 49 Republicans and .02 votes of those cast 
by the 26 White Democrats.  
7 The Republican wins the votes of the 49 Republicans and .02 votes of the 51 White Democrats. 
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consists of two Republican and one Democratic legislators. Thus the mandate may move the 
delegation to the right, as Republicans theorize.8  
 Lublin (1997) argues that majority minority mandates can result in Blacks losing 
representation even when the mandates do not result in a change in the delegation’s party mix. He 
posits that representative responsiveness to Black interests is non-linear. As the Black population 
increases the representative is increasingly likely to vote in accordance with the wishes of the 
Black population. However the degree of “Black influence” does not increase above the threshold 
of 40 percent Black. Therefore the creation of majority minority districts can decrease aggregate 
Black influence. Consider the case of two districts with populations that are each 40 percent 
Black. Following a mandate, the legislator must reallocate Black residents so that one of these 
districts is at least 51 percent Black. Under Lublin’s thesis the loss of Black influence in the one 
district is greater than the gain in influence in the other. Under the mandate, the delegation votes 
more conservatively on issues of Black interest. 
 Whether because of the malleability of the White Democrat vote or a non-linearity in 
Black influence, policy makers and political scientists largely agree that majority minority 
districts decrease Black substantive representation. In the next section I detail the congressional 
act that led to this controversial increase in majority minority districts. 
IIII History of the Voting Rights Act 
The lengths to which the southern White establishment reached, following 
Reconstruction, to prevent Blacks from exercising the franchise are well documented (Key, 
1949). Literacy tests, taxes and all White primaries (in what were essentially one party states) 
were some of the more humane obstacles when compared to barriers erected through violence. 
The iconic image of this brutality is the March 7, 1965 footage of Alabama police officers using 
tear gas, billy clubs and whips on peaceful demonstrators attempting to march from Selma to 
                                                 
8 In this example with Republicans rather than Democrats in control, the mandate still moves the delegation 
to the left as the legislature must move from creating three majority Republican districts to only two, as 
above. 
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Montgomery in support of Black voting rights. Within days of that “Bloody Sunday” President 
Johnson sent the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to Congress.   
The VRA is considered one of the most successful pieces of civil rights legislation in US 
history (Grofman and Handley, 1998). Two years following its passage Black voter registration 
rates in all southern states exceeded 50 percent, compared with a low among southern states of 
less than eight percent in Mississippi just prior to the legislation’s passage. Black voter turnout 
increased commensurately (United State Commission on Civil Rights, 1968).  
Today, we speak of political divisions as being “under the Voting Rights Act” or not. 
However, all political units are forbidden from engaging in discriminatory electoral procedures9 
under this act. Where the law differs for some jurisdictions is in regards to Section V of the 
legislation which mandates preclearance by the United States Department of Justice for any 
electoral procedure changes, including the one most pertinent for my purposes—the redrawing of 
districts for US Congress. The preclearance provision was aimed at preventing states from 
circumventing the spirit of the law as some southern states had done to keep de facto all White 
primaries after the practice had been disallowed de jure (United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, 1984).10 The decision of whether a political division was subject to the requirements of 
Section V was first based on the 1964 presidential election. Entities in which under 50 percent of 
citizens 18 and over registered or voted and in which an unlawful test or device, such as a literacy 
test, was used to determine eligibility for voter registration were subject to Section V. By this 
criterion the southern states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Virginia and many counties in North Carolina were placed under Section V. During the 1975 
renewal of the VRA, when Congress looked to the 1972 presidential election and added the 
                                                 
9 According to the VRA 1965, discriminatory electoral procedures include but are not limited to literacy 
tests, withholding information from minority voters or potential candidates, eliminating political 
jurisdictions or redrawing political boundaries to prevent minorities from attaining office. 
10 Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina tried to divorce primaries from state governance so 
that laws that were binding on the state would not be binding on the primary procedure. Alabama and 
Louisiana strengthened other barriers to Black voting  (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1968). 
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criterion of under 50 percent registered or voting, five percent or more of the population from a 
single language minority and a failure to provide electoral materials in said language, Texas and 
parts of Florida were added to the list. When even one political jurisdiction within a state is 
subject to Section V, the state’s entire Congressional redistricting plan must be pre-cleared. (See 
Table 1 for a list of the southern states and their pre-and post reform majority minority districts 
by treatment status.) 
While the act seemed to have a large immediate impact on minority registration and 
voting, an increase in minorities holding elected office, particularly at the federal level and 
particularly in the south was slower coming. The 97th congress which began in 1981 included 14 
Black congressional representatives from outside of the south (4.3 percent of non-southern 
representatives) and only three from within (3 percent of southern  representatives), despite the 
fact that the percentage of Blacks in the population of the south at the time was approximately 
double that of any other region.11 Part of the reason for the disparity, argue Grofman and Handley 
(1989) was that Blacks in the south live in rural areas and are geographically dispersed from one 
another while Blacks in the north primarily live in cities. It is, therefore, easier to create a 
compact and contiguous—as convention requires12—majority Black district outside of the south. 
Because of this lack of electoral progress, in 1982 when Congress renewed the Voting 
Rights Act, it amended the act to outlaw not “discriminatory intent” but “discriminatory results” 
(United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1984). This amendment, like all changes to the act, 
affected covered and non-covered states differently. First, because non-covered states already had 
a greater share of Black representatives, particularly relative to their Black populations, the 
amendment required fewer changes of these states. (See Table 1 for the number of majority Black 
districts and representatives, by state, before and after the 1990 redistricting.) Second, because of 
                                                 
11 The1980 percentage of Blacks in the population was 18.2 percent in the south, 5.2 percent in the west, 
9.1 percent in the north central and 9.9 percent in the northeast region (Gibson and King, 2002).  
12 While no current law mandates that districts be compact and contiguous, irregularly shaped districts are 
highly scrutinized and frequently challenged. As Justice Steven’s (cited in Kousser 1995) stated in Karcher 
V Dagget, “Dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation.” 
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the need for pre-clearance, covered states generally have to comply with new amendments first. 
In this case, their post-1990 census redistricting plans would have to comply with the new 
standard. Uncovered states would not have to alter their redistricting plans for compliance until 
they were on the losing end of a lawsuit on the matter (United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, 2005).  
When the Democratically controlled southern state legislators sat down to hash out the 
new congressional districts, they understood the 1982 mandate to mean that they must increase 
the number of majority minority districts in order to increase the number of minorities in 
congress.13 However, they did not anticipate the extent to which the Justice Department required 
they go. The covered state of North Carolina is a good example. The state’s initial plan, supported 
by all minority members of the state legislature, created the first majority Black federal 
congressional district in the state. Eight of the remaining 11 districts would be “Black influence” 
districts where Blacks comprised 15-20 percent of the population. The Democrats selected this 
plan over a plan developed by the Republican minority, which created two majority Black 
districts. The creation of two such districts was also supported by the ACLU and NAACP. The 
Justice Department rejected the North Carolina state plan by pointing to the Republican plan as 
evidence that a map more favorable to the election of Blacks could be created. Similar scenarios 
played out in other southern covered states. In Georgia the state legislature wanted to increase 
their number of majority Black districts from one to two and allow for Black influence in the 
remaining districts. The Justice Department insisted on three majority minority districts. And in 
Virginia the plan supported by the Black governor Douglas Wilder and the Democratic state 
legislature was rejected because of the existence of a Republican plan that created more majority 
Black districts (Cunningham, 2001). Black Representative Craig Washington (D-TX) said at the 
time, “If you have four districts in a state like Alabama, for example, with a sufficiently large 
                                                 
13 Their interpretation was based in large part on a federal judge’s rejection of Arkansas’ state legislative 
districting plan, not because the plan discriminated against Blacks, but because a plan more favorable to the 
election of Blacks could be drawn (Bullock and Dunn, 1999).  
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Black population to neutralize Republicans on some issues, and if you can create one Black 
district by gathering up all the Blacks in such a fashion that they elect a Black person to congress, 
and in the process you lose the leverage that you had in the three other districts, then that’s 
foolish to me. Every time one person votes for the things that I’m for, and that the black 
community is for, the other three from the state will probably vote against them.” (Swain, 2006). 
Thus Democrats were forced, by the Republican administration, to create more majority 
Black districts then they felt were optimal. Following redistricting the number of majority 
districts increased from three to 16 in covered southern districts and from three to four in 
uncovered states. The number of majority Black districts increased in all southern covered states 
except one.14 (See Table I.) All of these new Black districts sent Blacks to the 103rd congress. 
Black voters were not packed into these districts in Black supermajorities. These majority Black 
districts had a median percent Black of 59 which translated into a median percent Black of the 
voting age population of 55 percent.  
 In order to create so many majority Black districts compactness had to be violated.15 
Again, North Carolina is a good example. The state’s majority Black 12th district (See Figure I) 
snaked along I-85 (at times no wider than the highway). Said one candidate, “I love the district 
because I can drive down I-85 with both car doors open and hit every person in the district” 
(Barone and Ujifusa, 1994). Bullock and Dunn (1999) quantify what they see as “new extremes 
in creative cartography” by noting that the number of counties split into two districts increased by 
a factor of two (Florida) to 13 (South Carolina) following redistricting in seven southern states.  
 Their irregular shapes made these districts particularly vulnerable to legal challengers. 
Duke law professor Robinson Everett wrote that he was “incredulous” when he saw the shapes of 
                                                 
14 Mississippi with a 20 percent Black population and five districts both before and after the 1990 census 
already had one district. Increasing to two, should the second have elected a Black to congress as well, 
would have increased the fraction of Blacks in the congressional delegation above the fraction of Blacks in 
the residential population.   
15 Kousser (1995) argues that another force leading to more irregularly shaped districts in this round of 
redistricting was the more strict equality of population requirements imposed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Karcher v. Daggett in 1983. 
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North Carolina’s new districts; they seemed to “defy compactness and contiguousness 
requirements”.  When he learned that the districts were drawn to increase the number of Blacks in 
congress he was concerned that the districts violated White voter’s equal protection. Everett, 
himself White, and four other White co-plaintiffs filed suit (Everett, 2001). Everett’s case made it 
to the Supreme Court where he eventually triumphed. The districts were redrawn less irregularly. 
As a result the 12th district’s Black population fell from 57 to 36 percent (See Figure 1) beginning 
with the election for the 106th congress. Again, similar scenarios played out in other covered 
states. In six years 7 of the 13 new majority-Black districts (spanning five of eight southern 
covered states that had created them) were redrawn such that Blacks were no longer a majority. 
But, perhaps because of the power of their incumbency status, six of the seven Black Congress 
people were reelected by majority White districts (Grofman, Handlely and Lublin, 2000-2001).16 
(See Table 1 for state by state changes in districting and Black representation.)  
 After laying out data and methodology in the next section, I ask whether this increase 
(and then decrease) in the number of majority Black districts decreased Black substantive 
representation, as often stated.  
IV Data and Methodology 
 In order to evaluate whether there is a tradeoff between Black descriptive and substantive 
representation, I measure these constructs as follows.   
Descriptive Representation: As descriptive representation simply considers whether 
representatives share demographic characteristics with their constituents, I measure the level of 
Black descriptive representation by calculating the share of the state’s representatives who are 
Black.17 (Means and standard deviations for all outcome variables can be found in Table II.) 
                                                 
16 Cleo Fields (D-LA) chose not to run again.  
17 This information was collected using the Congressional Research Service’s African American Members 
of the United States Congress: 1980-2008 available at 
http://senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf and the United States House of Representative’s 
Black Members in Congress website http://baic.house.gov/. 
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Substantive Representation: A group is represented substantively, when the representative works 
to promote the political interest of the group. This is a more nebulous concept to measure than 
descriptive representation. Thus I present a variety of measures. 
1) Democratic Representatives: In two-party elections, Black Americans cast their votes in 
favor of the Democratic candidate 70 to 90% of the time (McDermott 1998). During my 
sample period, 79 percent of Black Southern respondents to the National Election Studies 
(NES) claimed an affiliation with the Democratic Party, where only 45 percent of White 
southerners stated such an affiliation.18 Therefore the first measure of substantive 
representation is the share Democrat of the state congressional delegation. 
2) Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Scores: Black NES respondents identify as 
significantly more liberal than non-Blacks, even controlling for party. Therefore the 
second measure of substantive representation is the representatives’ Americans for 
Democratic Action scores.19 The ADA, a liberal leaning interest group, typically selects 
20 pieces of legislation critical to liberals in each chamber in each year and awards 
congress members five points for a “correct” vote on each of these bills. Scores range 
from 0 (completely conservative) to 100 (completely liberal). Across the sample period, 
House Democrats averaged a score of 73, while Republicans averaged a 15.20  
3) Leadership Conference for Civil Rights (LCCR) scores: While on average Blacks are 
more liberal than non-Blacks, there are of course particular issues on which the liberal 
view is not the Black view.21 The LCCR, another liberal leaning interest group, calculates 
a voting score, based on 10-20 votes per congressional session that it considers crucial to 
                                                 
18 Authors calculations. 
19 Available at http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php. 
20 I do not adjust ADA, LCCR and CBC scores for comparability across years as prescribed by Groseclose, 
Levitt and Snyder (1999). Such an adjustment would be inappropriate in this analysis because it relies on 
restrictions in the changes in a representative’s mean preferences from year to year while I want to allow a 
representative’s voting record to change along with district composition. Nonetheless, Ananat and 
Washington (2009) show that LCCR scores are highly correlated (.84 or greater) with Poole and 
Rosenthal’s inter-temporally comparable Nominate scores available at www.voteview.com. 
21 Eric John Narcisse (in Cunningham, 2001) suggests that abortion, gay rights, school prayer and the death 
penalty are such issues.  
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promoting civil rights in this country. This score may better capture the issues of 
importance to Black Americans.  
4) Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) scores: A second measure of congressional voting on 
those issues of greatest importance to Black Americans is the extent to which a 
representative votes in accordance with the Congressional Black Caucus, as in Cameron, 
Epstein and O’Halloran (1996). I present results using only those ballots in which the 
CBC itself is in at least 80 percent agreement.22  Founded in 1969 by the then thirteen 
Black members of Congress, the CBC has as its goals “to positively influence the course 
of events pertinent to African Americans and others of similar experience and situation, 
and to achieve greater equity for persons of African descent in the design and content of 
domestic and international programs and services.”23 Every Black member of Congress, 
since the CBC’s founding, with the exception of JC Watts (R-OK), has been a member.24   
The correlation amongst these substantive representation measures ranges from .57 (share 
Democrat and average ADA score) and .82 (average LCCR and ADA scores).  
  I collapse these measures to state/congressional terms means.25 The fact that the 
state/congress is the unit of observation is the key difference between this study and most 
previous studies. The difference in results stems from the aggregation and not from data 
differences. If I run the regressions of outcomes on district percent Black controlling for district 
and time effects, I can replicate previous findings that as the percent of Black residents increases 
so too does the likelihood of electing a Black, a Democrat and a more liberal leaning 
representative. But as I argued previously, a district level analysis does not yield the answer to the 
                                                 
22 Data on how each member of Congress voted in each roll call vote are available on Poole and 
Rosenthal’s website www.voteview.com 
23 Goals taken from the Congressional Black Caucus Website 
(http://www.cbcfinc.org/About/CBC/index.html). 
24 Non-Black members of Congress are not permitted to join. Membership restrictions obtained in a 
communication with Myra Dandridge, spokesperson for the Congressional Black Caucus, July 7, 2006.  
25 Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) argue that the various vote summary scores represent 
probabilities of voting in favor of a piece of legislation and therefore can be averaged meaningfully.  
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question of how majority minority districts shape a state’s House delegation because the creation 
of these districts serves to increase the percent Black in some districts while simultaneously 
decreasing percent Black in others. I also note that when I include the square of percent Black in 
these same regressions the square enters positively and significantly. In other words, the 
nonlinearity that Lublin suggests is there, but in the opposite direction. As the Black population 
increases the congressperson becomes increasingly liberal at an increasing rate, which previews 
my findings that in the aggregate the creation of majority minority districts seems to increase the 
liberal leaning of the state’s House delegation.   
In the analysis, I consider ten congresses spanning twenty years. The 98th-102nd (1983-
1992) fall in the period before elections were based on the 1990 redistricting which dramatically 
increased the number of majority minority districts. The 103rd -107th (1993-2002) congresses fall 
in the post period. I limit focus to the 15 former slaveholding states and run regressions of the 
form of:  
(1)  Outcomest =  +1(vra) + 2(post) + 3(vra*post) + s + t + Xst + ust 
where Outcome is one of the five representation measures laid out above. VRA is an indicator for 
whether the state falls under Section V of the Voting Rights Act. Because of judicial review, 
these states faced greater pressure to construct a 1990 redistricting plan that included more 
majority minority districts. Post is an indicator for the period in which 1990 census redistricting 
applies. The interaction post*vra is the key independent variable of interest. A positive significant 
B3 in the specification for Black representation and negative significant B3’s in the specifications 
for Black substantive representation would indicate that the common wisdom is correct: Majority 
minority districts have the perverse impact of increasing Black descriptive representation while 
decreasing Black substantive representation. This pattern of coefficients would support the view 
that the creation of majority Black districts moves the state’s congressional delegation in a more 
conservative direction. s and t  are a vector of state and congressional term fixed effects 
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respectively which control for fixed differences in state’s political climates and for session to 
session movements in national political leanings.  
The assumption that allows for the interpretation of B3 as the causal impact of majority 
minority districts on the composition of the state House delegation is that absent the increase in 
majority minority districts in the covered states, the two sets of states would have seen their 
representative characteristics evolve in similar patterns, conditional on control variables. To 
increase the credibility of that assumption I include X, a vector of time varying state level 
controls which include percent Black in the population and the percent of the state delegation that 
is new in the most basic specification. Representatives with a larger share of Black voters tend to 
vote more liberally. (See Grose, 2005 for a summary of this literature) New representatives have 
also been shown to vote differently than veterans (Stratmann, 2000). In what I refer to 
subsequently as specification 2 this vector is expanded to include demographic characteristics that 
predict the state’s political leaning: state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates 
and these measures for the state’s Black population in particular. These additional covariates are 
calculated using March Current Population Survey data. Specification 3 includes the covariates of 
the previous specification in addition to state*year linear trends to allow for states to be trending 
differently politically overtime.  
 Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for serial correlation and 
dependence within state observations. Because small numbers of clusters tends to lead to over 
rejection of the null, I follow Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) in determining significance 
based on a t distribution with degrees of freedom one less than the number of clusters.  
V Results 
 The basic results are illustrated in Figure II. Panel A illustrates the large increase in 
majority minority districts that occurred in covered states between the 102nd and 103rd congresses. 
Where uncovered states (dotted line) increased their share majority minority districts an average 
of two percentage points, the covered states (solid line) increased from an average of five to an 
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average of seventeen percent majority minority districts across these two congresses. Court 
challenges decreased that share in the 105th and 106th congress. Nonetheless, after the 103rd 
congress the share of majority minority districts in covered states does not fall below that of the 
uncovered states or below the pre-period share in covered states. The mandate to increase the 
share of majority minority districts had the long lasting impact of doing exactly that. 
 The goal of the majority minority district mandate was to increase the number of Blacks 
in congress. It worked, panel B shows. The share of Black representatives among uncovered 
districts remained basically flat across the ten congresses. In the covered states there was a small 
increase in share Black in the pre-period as the result of majority Black districts created in the 
1980 redistricting. These districts were represented by incumbent Whites. When the Whites 
retired, Blacks won these seats. However, there is a stark increase in percent Black in the covered 
states between the 102nd and 103rd congresses. Share Black increased from five to 17 percent as 
all the newly Black districts sent Blacks to congress.  (Only one White incumbent, Charles 
Hatcher D-GA, ran for a seat in the 103rd congress from a majority Black district. He was 
defeated.)  And even as some majority Black districts were dismantled later in the redistricting 
period, the now incumbent Black legislators (save one as explained in Section III) were reelected 
by their now majority White districts, the graph further illustrates with the small decrease in share 
Black in the delegation between the 105th and 106th congresses. 
 Was this increase in descriptive representation accompanied by a decrease in substantive 
representation?  The remaining panels of the table indicate that the answer to this question is no. 
Panel C illustrates what those who argue that majority minority districts aid Republicans often 
note:  the share of Democratic representatives in the covered delegations decreased in the post-
mandate period. However, the figure also demonstrates that the decline in Democratic share was 
similar (and in fact slightly greater) in the uncovered states during this time. Panel D addresses 
the same issue looking at the delegations’ voting records as rated by the liberal leaning ADA. 
Once again we see that in the post-period, the delegations in covered states are on average more 
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conservative than in the pre-period, but that the fall in liberalism is greater in the uncovered 
states. Thus Figure II suggests that the increase in majority minority districts was accompanied by 
a relative increase in Blacks in the delegation but not in conservatism. The figure supports the 
contention of Guinier (1995) and Engstrom (1995) that the increase in the share of Republicans in 
congress was due to a national movement toward conservatism and not to the result of new 
redistricting rules.  
 The figures further provide support for the identifying assumption of the quantitative 
analysis that follows. In order to identify the causal impact of the creation of the majority 
minority districts I assume that control and treatment states would have seen similar trends in the 
party mix and voting patterns of their legislative delegations in the absence of the increase in 
majority minority districts in treatment states. Panels C and D demonstrate that in the pre-period 
(before the increase in majority minority districts in treatment states in the 103rd congress) the two 
groups of states saw similar trends in their delegations’ behavior. 
 I turn to the formal results in the first column of Table III where I present estimates from 
regressions of the form of (1). The share of Black representatives in the average state delegation 
increased by a significant 13 percentage points in covered states relative to uncovered states in 
the post period, indicates the first cell. (Each cell in the table presents the estimated coefficient for 
vra*post from a different regression.) The result is robust to including additional demographic 
controls (column 2) and state trends (column 3). In the remaining rows I examine Black 
substantive representation. As demonstrated in the second row there is no evidence that the 
creation of majority minority districts was accompanied by a decrease in Democrats in the 
delegation. In fact, point estimates, across the three specifications, while insignificant, indicate an 
increase of five to 13 percentage points. In the next row I examine the impact of majority 
minority districts on the liberal leaning of the votes of the state’s delegation. Once again point 
estimates indicate an increase in liberalism, here about ¾ of a standard deviation. Turning to the 
issues of particular interest to the Black community as captured by the LCCR and CBC scores, 
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we find a similar pattern of insignificant yet consistently positive increases in liberalism. In the 
case of the ADA and LCCR scores I can rule out decreases larger than one point in magnitude on 
a scale from 1 to 100. While standard errors in the Democratic and CBC specifications are large 
and I cannot reject substantial decreases in liberalism, the fact that all point estimates are positive 
provides additional evidence against the contention that majority minority districts move 
delegations in a more conservative direction.  
 To put the point estimates in perspective it is helpful to note that the increase in the ADA 
score is higher than expected based solely on the change in party composition. The five 
percentage point increase in share Democratic times 58, the difference in average ADA score 
between Democrats and Republicans, yields an expected increase in ADA of only 2.9. The larger 
actual increase in ADA score is due in part to the fact that majority minority districts result in the 
election of Black Democrats who are more liberal than the White Democrats they replace. Further 
evidence of this is the fact that there is not a simple mean shift in the voting record in the treated 
delegations, but there is an increase in voting dispersion as well. The final row of the table 
presents results using the standard deviation of ADA score as an outcome and shows a positive 
(and significant in two specifications) coefficient on  vra*post.  
As majority minority districts were designed to increase representation for Blacks, it is 
important to examine their impact on this population in particular. In the second half of the table I 
examine impacts on the average southern Black by weighting regressions by Black population.26 
Once again there is no evidence of a tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation. 
The treated increase their share Black representatives by about ten percentage points, an estimate 
which is significant in two of three specifications. And while the share Democratic results are 
unstable in sign across specifications, the results on political leaning of the state are consistently 
in a more liberal direction. In fact in the final specification, accounting for state-trends, we see a 
significant increase in the ADA and CBC scores.  
                                                 
26 The states in the sample with the largest number of Blacks are Texas, Florida and Georgia.  
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Robustness checks are performed in Table IV. In the first column I exclude the border 
states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri. The fact that these states were not part of 
the confederacy suggests that their historic relationship with Blacks may be different from states 
of the deeper south. And because no border states met the low turnout and discriminatory 
practices criteria, none is subject to Section V of the Voting Rights Act.   
To further ensure that results are not driven by changing differences in culture in 
treatment and control states, in column 2 I limit the treatment states to Texas and Florida, the two 
southern states which fall under the Voting Rights Act not because of passed transgressions 
against Black voters but because of a failure to offer Spanish language materials to language 
minority voters. I once again include border states. This specification matches treatment and 
control states, neither of which in 1965 was judged as having discriminatory voting practices 
against Black Americans. Results are robust to both of these changes in sample. Across the two 
samples there is a significant increase in Black representation of about ten percentage points, a 
noisily estimated impact on party composition and while results on the liberal leanings of the vote 
are significant in only a third of specifications, they are consistently positive. Thus once again 
results provide no evidence of majority minority districts moving the House delegation in a more 
conservative direction.  
In the final robustness check of the table I consider a different measure of pressure to 
create majority minority districts. Instead of Section V status, I consider a state as under pressure 
in the post period if the share of Black Representatives in the 102nd congress is less than the share 
Black in the population and if another Black Representative could be added without increasing 
the number of Black Representatives over parity. (These states, I argue, would have been more 
likely to face litigation by the public had they failed to create additional majority minority 
districts.) Under this definition all states retain the same pressured/not pressured status with two 
exceptions. Maryland with 12.5 percent Black representatives, a 25 percent Black population and 
eight districts is not under VRA but is considered pressured by the new definition. Mississippi, 
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covered, with 20 percent Black representatives, 36 percent Black population and 5 districts, is 
considered not pressured. As indicated by the consistently positive coefficients in column 3, the 
result of majority minority districts failing to decrease the liberalness of the delegation is robust 
to this change. 
Up to this point, I have focused on the impact of the increase in majority minority 
districts mandated by congress and the justice department.  While the focus on this simple dd is 
driven by power considerations, in an additional robustness check I consider a second exogenous 
shock to the share of Black districts: the court ordered dismantling of several Black districts. As 
indicated in Figure II, this dismantling primarily took place between the 105th and 106th 
congresses. In Table V I run an expanded version of equation 1 in which I include the triple 
interaction of covered, post and a dummy for the 105th-107th congresses to understand whether 
state delegations moved in a more liberal direction following the elimination of several majority 
minority districts.27 Table V indicates that the answer is no. When the share of majority minority 
districts increases the share Democratic in the delegation increases as well and when the number 
of majority minority districts decreases so does the share Democratic. Results are insignificant, 
but robust in sign and magnitude across specifications and across measures of substantive 
representation as indicated by the ADA results in the remainder of the table.  
Thus I find robust evidence that the increase in majority minority districts did not lead to 
a decline in Black substantive representation. The pre-trend graphical analysis suggests that the 
identification strategy is sound, although, one can never prove the identifying assumption. I note, 
however, that in order to maintain the argument that majority minority districts lead to a decrease 
in Black representation one would have to argue that my results are biased upwards. In other 
words, one would have to believe, that in the absence of the increase in majority minority 
districts, treatment states—historically more antagonistic toward Blacks—would have trended in 
an even more liberal direction relative to controls. This seems unlikely.  
                                                 
27 The sample here is all southern states. Regressions are unweighted.  
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Tradeoff for Latinos? 
 In the previous section I showed that there was no evidence that majority minority 
districts led to a tradeoff between substantive and descriptive representation for southern Blacks. 
However, the policy also impacted Latino voters. I examine in this section whether the tradeoff 
exists for these voters. Latinos share several characteristics with Blacks that are relevant to 
political efficacy. Like Blacks, Latinos are more liberal than average.28 Sixty-one percent of 
southwestern Latino respondents to the NES during the sample period identified as Democrats. 
Among non-Latinos the figure was 47 percent. Mexican Americans in the southwest in particular 
have suffered a history of lynching (Carrigan, 2003) and segregation (Ruiz, 2001). Latinos are a 
protected class. And in regards to Voting Rights Act, states may be covered under Section V 
based on a historical failure to provide bilingual materials to a group who comprises five percent 
or more of an area’s population. Arizona, California29 and Texas are covered for that reason. The 
remaining states that were formerly Mexican territory (Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah) 
are not.  (See Table VI for a list of sample states and their share of majority Latino districts and 
representatives over time.)  
 In Figure III I examine graphically how the congressional delegation of southwestern 
southern states changed with the increase in majority Latino districts. I focus on the southwest 
where the presence of Latinos is arguable more exogenous than in the remainder of the country. 
In this area Latino history is long and the Latino population is large, which makes the analysis 
comparable to that of Blacks in the southern portion of the country. As indicated in Panel A of the 
figure there were no majority Latino districts in uncovered states across the sample period. The 
covered states in the southwest, like those in the south, saw a large increase in majority minority 
districts from .09 to .18 between the 102nd and 103rd congresses. And unlike in the south the vast 
majority of these districts remained intact until the next redistricting. Turning to the question of 
                                                 
28 Blacks are more liberal than Latinos.  
29 Kings, Merced and Yuba counties are covered for failure to provide bilingual materials.  Monterey and 
Yuba are covered because of the use of an illegal test or device. 
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descriptive representation in Panel B while covered states are increasing share Latino in their 
delegation over the sample period (especially in relation to the uncovered states where share 
Latino is decreasing), there is no clear jump between the 102nd and 103rd districts when 
redistricting took place. This is because White incumbents ran and won in many of these newly 
created districts.30 Thus for example in California it wasn’t until the last congress of the 
redistricting period that Latinos represented all of the majority Latino districts.  
 In the remainder of the figure I examine whether this increase in majority Latino districts 
decreased Latino substantive representation. As for Blacks, the answer seems to be no. While the 
graphs are not as smooth as for the southern sample that included more states, Panel C does 
indicate that the fraction of Democratic representatives is basically flat in the covered states 
across the entire sample period. The change in Democratic composition in the control states 
jumps a bit from congress to congress but seems to show a relative decrease in share Democratic 
in the 103rd and later congresses. This pattern is echoed in Panel D where the outcome is ADA 
score. Relative to uncovered states, covered states seem to move in a more liberal direction after 
the increase in the number of majority minority districts. 
 This finding is robust to the addition of controls in regression analysis as shown in Table 
VII. The table indicates that following the increase in majority minority districts the share of 
Latino districts increased in covered states or was basically flat, when considered relative to 
trend. Meanwhile there is no evidence of a decrease in Latino substantive representation. Once 
again point estimates on share Democratic, average ADA score and average agreement with 
congressional Latinos indicate exactly the reverse. In fact there is a significant increase in 
substantive representation according to that last measure in two of three specifications.31 
VI Conclusion 
                                                 
30 Only one White incumbent, Charles Hatcher D-GA, ran in a majority Black district in the south. He was 
defeated. 
31 The results are robust to weighting states by Latino population and to changing the sample to those states 
whose 1990 population was at least 10 percent Latino.  
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 With the 1982 renewal congress amended the Voting Rights Act to encourage the 
creation of more majority minority districts in the hopes of sending more minority legislators to 
congress. Both civil rights group and the Republican Party saw the amended legislation as a boon 
to their cause. Civil rights groups believe that minority congress people are more likely to bring 
resources back to minority communities. Republicans look on Democratic districts stripped of 
their minority voters as opportunities to turn Democratic districts Republican.  In fact the party 
and many political scientists still see the increased majority minority districts as responsible at 
least in part for the Republican’s winning back control of the House in 1994. Thus the common 
view is that majority minority districts have a perverse effect. They increase the fraction of 
minorities in congress, while shifting the congressional voting away from minorities’ ideal point.  
 In this paper I amass data on state congressional delegations and demonstrate that this 
supposed trade off did not exist during the redistricting that resulted in the largest increase in 
majority minority districts in our history. While I find that majority Black districts increase the 
number of Blacks in congress, there is no evidence that they serve to increase the number of 
Republicans or move the congress in a more conservative direction. In fact point estimates 
indicate exactly the reverse both for majority Black districts in the south and for majority Latino 
districts in the southwest. I find no evidence that majority minority districts decrease minority 
representation on policy issues. 
 What about the impacts of the other half of this trade off? Majority Black districts 
increase the number of Blacks in congress. Does this increase in descriptive representation yield 
more resources for the Black community? Using the mandate to create majority minority districts 
as an instrument for Black representation I examined this question in relation to federal funding 
to Black communities and Black employment in federal government. Unfortunately point 
estimates were too noisy to be informative. Thus examining the implications of the other half of 
this truism remains a task for future work.  
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Table I: Change in the Number of Majority Black Districts and Black Representatives in Southern States across Congresses 
   102nd congress 103rd congress 107th congress 
 Reason 
Section 
V 
1990  
percent 
Black 
Majority 
Black 
Districts 
Black 
Representatives
Majority 
Black 
Districts 
Black 
Representatives
Majority 
Black 
Districts 
Black 
Representatives 
States Under VRA Section V 
Alabama Blacks 25 0/7 0/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 
Florida Latinos 14 0/19 0/19 3/23 3/23 2/23 3/23 
Georgia Blacks 27 1/10 1/10 3/11 3/11 1/11 3/11 
Louisiana Blacks 31 1/8 1/8 2/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 
Mississippi Blacks 36 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 
North 
Carolina 
Blacks 22 0/11 0*/11 2/11 2/12 1/12 2/12 
South 
Carolina 
Blacks 30 0/6 0/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 
Texas Latinos 12 0/27 1/27 2/30 2/30 0/30 2/30 
Virginia Blacks 19 0/10 0/10 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 
         
States not Under VRA Section V 
Arkansas  16 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 
Delaware  17 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
Kentucky  7 0/7 0/7 0/6 0/6 0/6 0/6 
Maryland  25 1/8 1/8 2/8 2/8 2/8 2/8 
Missouri  11 1/9 2/9 1/9 2/9 1/9 1/9 
Tennessee  16 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Sources: 1990 percent black from census using American Fact Finder. Majority minority districts, based on the racial makeup of the population at 
the time of the 1990 census, from various issues of the Almanac of American Politics and Grofman, Handley and Lublin (2000-2001). Black 
members of congress from the Congressional Research Service’s African American Members of the United States Congress: 1980-2008 available at 
http://senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf and the United States House of Representative’s Black Members in Congress website 
http://baic.house.gov/.  
*Eva Clayton (D-NC) served during only two months of the 102nd congress, following the death of the incumbent.  
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Table II: Summary Statistics of Average State Representative Characteristics (Standard 
Deviation in Parentheses) 
 All Southern 
States 
All Southern 
States (Black 
Population 
Weighted) 
Non 
Border 
States 
Excluding 
Black 
Treatment 
Former 
Mexican 
Territory 
States 
Black .088 
(.090) 
.103 
(.090) 
.086 
(.086) 
.074 
(.082) 
 
Latino     .081 
(.151) 
Democratic .558 
(.213) 
.554 
(.181) 
.565 
(.176) 
.556 
(.225) 
.396 
(.192) 
ADA score 37.7 
(12.6) 
37.0 
(10.4) 
34.9 
(8.2) 
42.4 
(13.9) 
37.0 
(17.6) 
Standard 
Deviation of 
ADA score 
30.8 
(7.4) 
31.8 
(7.0) 
30.4 
(7.2) 
31.8 
(7.1) 
34.9 
(12.5) 
LCCR score 49.3 
(14.0) 
48.0 
(11.8) 
46.5 
(10.7) 
53.7 
(14.9) 
 
Agreement 
with CBC 
.622 
(.088) 
.616 
(.078) 
.608 
(.072) 
.638 
(.096) 
 
Agreement 
with Latino 
congress 
persons 
    .639 
(.111) 
States in 
Sample: 
AL, AR, DE, 
FL, GA, KY, 
LA, MD, 
MO, MS, NC, 
SC, TN, TX, 
VA 
AL, AR, DE, 
FL, GA, KY, 
LA, MD, MO, 
MS, NC, SC, 
TN, TX, VA 
AL, AR, 
FL, GA, 
LA, MS, 
NC, SC, 
TN, TX, 
VA 
AR, DE, 
FL, KY, 
MD, MO, 
TN, TX 
AZ, CA, 
CO, NM, 
NV, TX, 
UT 
Notes: In the first two columns of statistics N=150, with the exception of standard deviation where N=140. 
Delaware has only one representative. In the third column N=110, in the fourth N=80 (70) an in the final 
column N=70.   
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Table III: Impact of Increased Majority Minority Districts on State Representative 
Characteristics 
(Each cell presents the coefficient on covered*post) 
 Southern States 
(unweighted) 
Southern States (Black population 
weighted) 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Black .134*** 
(.028) 
.14*** 
(.03) 
.1** 
(.041) 
.119*** 
(.033) 
.129*** 
(.035) 
.081 
(.052) 
Democratic .052 
(.124) 
.067 
(.14) 
.13 
(.147) 
-.055 
(.077) 
-.059  
(.084) 
.051 
(.069) 
ADA score 9.6 
(5.8) 
11.0 
(6.8) 
13.2 
(7.7) 
4.0 
(3.2) 
3.6 
(3.0) 
9.2* 
(3.8) 
LCCR score 9.3 
(5.7) 
10.0 
(6.4) 
17.4 
(9.0) 
4.1 
(3.4) 
3.0 
(3.8) 
11.8** 
(4.9) 
CBC score .049 
(.041) 
.055 
(.05) 
.067 
(.063) 
.013 
(.026) 
.007 
(.025) 
.032 
(.032) 
Standard Deviation of 
ADA score 
8.9** 
(3.0) 
8.4** 
(3.1) 
4.8 
(4.7) 
6.3** 
(2.7) 
6.3** 
(2.7) 
3.8 
(4.0) 
Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state 
population that is Black and percent of state delegation that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls 
for state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and those measures for state Black 
population. Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year linear trends. Standard errors clustered at 
the state level. Significance levels determined based on tx distribution where x is defined as the number of 
clusters less one. N=150 (140 for standard deviation of ADA score;  Delaware has only one representative). 
***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table IV: Impact of Increased Majority Minority Districts on State Representative 
Characteristics, Robustness to Sampling Changes 
 Non-Border 
States 
Excluding Black 
Treatment 
Treatment Based on 
Distance from Parity in 
102nd 
Black .125*** 
(.025) 
.086** 
(.036) 
.137*** 
(.029) 
Democratic -.052 
(.049) 
.114 
(.108) 
.079 
(.142) 
ADA score 4.3 
(3.3) 
12.1* 
(5.7) 
10.8 
(6.1) 
LCCR score 4.3 
(3.9) 
14.8** 
(5.9) 
8.9 
(6.6) 
CBC score .018 
(.02) 
.082 
(.037) 
.057 
(.045) 
Standard Deviation of 
ADA score 
7.5*** 
(1.5) 
4.3 
(2.9) 
8.2** 
(3.5) 
Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state 
population that is Black and percent of state delegation that is new. Significance levels determined based on 
tx distribution where x is defined as the number of clusters less one. In column one N=110, in two N=80 (70 
for standard deviation) and in three N=150 (140 for standard deviation). ***denotes significance at the 1 
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.  
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Table V: Impact of Increased and Decreased Majority Minority Districts 
on State Representative Characteristics 
Outcome: Democrats ADA 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Covered*post .112 
(.142) 
.132 
(.149)
.117 
(.151)
12.2 
(7.6)
13.6 
(8.0)
12.5 
(7.3)
Covered*post*(105-107) -.103 
(.085) 
-.109 
(.072)
-.104 
(.093)
-4.3 
(7.9)
-4.3  
(6.0)
-6.3 
(5.6)
Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and 
controls for percent of state population that is Black and percent of state delegation 
that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls for state poverty, high school 
graduation and employment rates and those measures for state Black population. 
Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year linear trends. Standard errors 
clustered at the state level. Significance levels determined based on tx distribution 
where x is defined as the number of clusters less one. N=150.  
 
 31
Table VI: Change in the Number of Majority Latino Districts and Latino Representatives in Southwestern States across Congresses 
  102nd Congress 103rd Congress 107th Congress 
 1990 
percent 
Latino 
Majority 
Latino 
Districts 
Latino 
Representatives 
Majority 
Latino 
Districts 
Latino 
Representatives 
Majority 
Latino 
Districts 
Latino 
Representatives 
States Under VRA Section V 
Arizona 19 0/5 0/5* 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 
California 26 4/45 3/45 6/52 4/52 6/52 6/52 
Texas 26 5/27 4/27 7/30 5/30 6/30 6/30 
States not Under VRA Section V 
Colorado 13 0/6 0/6 0/6 0/6 0/6 0/6 
Nevada 10 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/2 
New Mexico 38 0/3 1/3 0/3 1/3 0/3 0/3 
Utah 5 0/3 0/3 0/3 0/3 0/3 0/3 
Sources: Latino population from The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief, May 2001. Majority minority districts, based on the racial makeup of the 
population at the time of the 1990 census, from various issues of the Almanac of American Politics. Latino Members of Congress from the Library of Congress’ 
Hispanic Members of Congress at http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/congress/. 
Notes: *Edward Pastor (D-AZ) elected in the middle of the 102nd congress in a special election. 
Table VII: Impact of Increased Majority Latino Districts on State 
Representative Characteristics 
(Each cell presents the coefficient on covered*post)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Latino .164 
(.117)
.255 
(.145)
.009  
(.039)
Democratic .079  
(.047)
.074 
(.074)
.216 
(.116)
ADA score 3.3 
(2.1) 
4.1 
(3.9) 
13.9  
(10.0)
Agreement with Congressional Latinos .041 
(.045)
.06* 
(.03) 
.153* 
(.075)
Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and 
controls for percent of state population that is Latino and percent of state 
delegation that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls for state poverty, 
high school graduation and employment rates and those measures for state 
Latino population. Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year 
linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Significance levels 
determined based on tx distribution where x is defined as the number of 
clusters less one. N=70. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at 
the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
Figure I: 1990 North Carolina Redistricting 
 
Before the 1990 redistricting North Carolina districts primarily followed county lines. 
There were no majority Black districts. 102nd districts pictured below. County percent 
Black shaded. 
 
 
 
After the 1990 redistricting North Carolina districts were shaped less regularly. 103rd 
congressional districts pictured below.  
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Figure I: 1990 North Carolina Redistricting (continued) 
 
 
The 103rd districts majority Black districts (1st and 12th) particularly created controversy 
for their irregular shapes. 
 
 
 
After the North Carolina districts were found to be a violation of White voters’ equal 
protection, the districts had to be redrawn for the 106th and 107th congresses. Percent 
Black in the 12th fell from 57 to 36 percent. 
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Figure II: Change in Characteristics of Southern State Districts and Representatives Over 
Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status 
 
A: Majority Black Districts 
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B: Black Representatives 
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Notes:      represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act;      represent covered states. 
X axis demarcates congressional sessions.  
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Figure II: Change in Characteristics of Southern State Districts and Representatives Over 
Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status (continued) 
 
C. Democratic Representatives 
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D. Average ADA Scores 
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Notes:      represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act;      represent covered states. 
X axis demarcates congressional sessions.  
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Figure III: Change in Characteristics of Former Mexican Territory State Districts and 
Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status 
     
A: Majority Latino Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Latino Representatives 
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Notes:      represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act;      represent covered states. 
X axis demarcates congressional sessions.  
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Figure III: Change in Characteristics of Former Mexican Territory State Districts and 
Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status (continued) 
     
C. Democratic Representatives 
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Notes:      represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act;      represent covered states. 
X axis demarcates congressional sessions.  
 
